Submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee International Treaty Examination of the Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and India

Tēnā koutou.

Thank you for the opportunity to present Ngā Toki Whakarururanga’s feedback to this hearing of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee regarding the Free Trade Agreement between the Governments of New Zealand and India.

My name is Donna Kerridge. I am a Kaihautū Rongoā serving on the leadership team of Ngā Toki Whakarururanga (NTW).

Who is Ngā Toki Whakarururanga?

Ngā Toki Whakarururanga was established under a Mediation Agreement signed with the Crown in 2020 to work alongside the Crown in meeting its responsibilities under Te Tiriti o Waitangi and He Whakaputanga in matters relating to trade policy, negotiations, and international agreements.

The objective of that Mediation Agreement is to ensure that Ngā Toki Whakarururanga has genuine and meaningful influence on negotiations such as the India–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement. Despite this commitment, the negotiating text was not shared with Ngā Toki Whakarururanga on a confidential basis prior to the agreement being signed.

Ngā Toki Whakarururanga’s Tiriti assessment concludes that, in addition to a flawed process, the final agreement is not Tiriti-compliant. It also failed to include an enhanced Treaty protection mechanism that had been co-designed by MFAT and NTW as an example of emerging best practice.

In our view, this agreement exposes both Government and business to unnecessary risk and, more importantly, represents a missed opportunity for New Zealand to develop a trade template that reflects genuine partnership with both our international trading partners and our Te Tiriti partners.

NTW is not anti-trade. We support astute trading partnerships that are ethical, culturally grounded, commercially viable, and internationally credible.

Māori have a long history as successful traders and entrepreneurs. Historically, we have proven ourselves to be exceptional strategists, not only in warfare but also in commerce. Across generations we have actively resisted external control over our trade enterprises, whether in agriculture, fisheries, rongoā, food sovereignty, the stewardship of taonga species, or international trade. We have consistently affirmed that rangatiratanga includes economic sovereignty.

Māori expect to work with and alongside others as equal partners, whether with the New Zealand Government or global trading partners, advancing opportunities for Aotearoa New Zealand while strengthening and protecting Māori intergenerational knowledge, rights, and responsibilities in accordance with Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

Personal Experience

In 2025, Dr Jessica Hutchings and I travelled to India to meet with farmers and discuss seed sovereignty and traditional knowledge sharing. We discovered that we had much in common in relation to food sovereignty, environmental sustainability, and long-term economic aspirations.

Matua Pita Tipene, Co-Convenor of NTW, and I also travelled to Queenstown to meet with New Zealand and Indian trade officials. We were struck by how much common ground existed between us and by the potential for a productive and mutually beneficial relationship.

For that reason, the eventual text of the agreement came as a surprise. The failure to adequately protect rights and responsibilities arising under Te Tiriti o Waitangi, together with what appears to be an imbalance in the distribution of risks and benefits, was deeply disappointing.

What Does the Agreement Achieve?

To be absolutely honest, this agreement feels more like a pre-election political exercise than a carefully constructed partnership between trade allies.

The agreement appears heavily weighted in favour of India’s interests. It exchanges aspirational tariff reductions for significant New Zealand investment commitments, with little evidence of reciprocal investment into New Zealand and substantial access to elements of New Zealand’s knowledge economy.

In effect, the agreement has the potential to strengthen India’s ability to compete with New Zealand in global markets while offering uncertain returns in exchange. At times it feels less like a negotiated partnership and more like a “take it or leave it” proposition.

New Zealand appears to be taking considerable risks in exchange for targets that may prove difficult to achieve and protections that, in some instances, appear weak or difficult to enforce, including protections associated with the Government’s commitments under Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

To be blunt, Te Tiriti remains one of the few mechanisms available to Aotearoa New Zealand to protect itself against economic domination by predatory oligopolies and significantly larger trading nations.

Enduring and mutually beneficial trade agreements rely upon transparency, mutual trust, reciprocity, and a fair distribution of risks and rewards. When the detail of this agreement is examined closely, it appears to fall short on several of those measures.

What Are the Risks?

This agreement risks undermining commitments made by our collective forebears in 1840 through Te Tiriti o Waitangi, including Māori autonomy and the ability to determine our own future.

There is no meaningful recognition of the constitutional status of Te Tiriti o Waitangi within the agreement, nor adequate protection for measures taken by the Crown to fulfil its obligations under Te Tiriti.

The ability of Māori to exercise rangatiratanga under this agreement will largely depend on various committees established to oversee its implementation. Yet there is no provision guaranteeing Māori participation in those committees or in the decisions they make. This omission is significant.

Questions also remain regarding the expectation that New Zealand will invest approximately \$34 billion in India over the next fifteen years.

Who is expected to make this investment? Have existing exporters agreed to these commitments? Is there evidence that businesses benefiting from tariff reductions are willing or able to redirect investment into India at this scale?

The numbers simply do not appear to stack up. New Zealand’s total outward investment across all countries in 2025 was approximately \$1.5 billion. Against that backdrop, a \$34 billion investment aspiration raises serious questions regarding feasibility and implementation.

There also appears to be little discussion regarding how such commitments align with New Zealand’s current economic circumstances, including ongoing concerns regarding productivity, fiscal constraints, and the current account deficit.

While India is a valued trading partner, it is also a potential competitor. Once knowledge has been transferred, there is little to prevent India from leveraging its scale, capital, and market size to compete directly with New Zealand in sectors where we currently hold a competitive advantage.

The agreement appears to contain few mechanisms that encourage genuine partnership between Indian and New Zealand enterprises, including Māori businesses, in ways that would combine New Zealand’s expertise with India’s scale to pursue new opportunities together.

Nor should we assume that tariff reductions alone will provide New Zealand exporters with a unique advantage. India already maintains trade agreements with larger economies and blocs including Australia, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United Arab Emirates, and EFTA nations. Many of these countries possess substantially greater negotiating leverage than New Zealand.

Conclusion

Te Tiriti o Waitangi is not a barrier to trade. It is one of New Zealand’s most important safeguards against economic exploitation and the erosion of our ability to determine our own future.

Aotearoa must protect its natural resources, biodiversity, knowledge economy, and mātauranga Māori through robust Treaty-compliant frameworks within all international agreements.

Te Tiriti provides a legitimate and necessary mechanism through which New Zealand can protect both its unique economic strengths and the rights and responsibilities of Māori. Weak indigenous protection provisions have already demonstrated their limitations internationally. The experience of Mexico’s efforts to restrict GMO corn imports provides a reminder that trade agreements can constrain a nation’s ability to act in accordance with its own priorities.

This agreement fails to adequately protect the people of New Zealand, including the rights and responsibilities guaranteed under Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

Ngā Toki Whakarururanga remains committed to shaping trade systems that are ethical, culturally grounded, commercially viable, and internationally credible. We seek trade arrangements that deliver mutual benefit while protecting communities, biodiversity, indigenous knowledge systems, and future generations from highly extractive models of economic development.

If New Zealand is to succeed internationally, it will not be through scale alone. It will be through the combination of our unique biodiversity, indigenous knowledge systems, ethical leadership, innovation, and reputation as a trusted source of high-quality products and services. Those strengths must be protected as carefully as they are promoted.

For these reasons, Ngā Toki Whakarururanga cannot support the agreement being enacted in its current form. Significant revision is required to ensure that it adequately protects the rights and responsibilities affirmed under Te Tiriti o Waitangi, including the Treaty exception clause jointly developed by NTW and MFAT, and safeguards the long-term economic security and sustainability of the people of Aotearoa New Zealand.